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Structural Realism: a neo-Kantian perspective 
 
MICHELA MASSIMI 
  
DEPT. OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY STUDIES 
UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON 
 
1. Structural realism: the status quo 
 
 
 Structural realism was notoriously born in the attempt to reach a compromise 
between a realist’s argument and an antirealist’s one, namely the ‘no miracle’ 
argument and the ‘pessimistic meta-induction’, respectively. According to the ‘no 
miracle’ argument, scientific realism is the only philosophy that does not make the 
success of science a miracle. The only way of explaining why science is so 
successful in making predictions that most of times turn out to be verified, is to 
believe that theoretical terms refer, that theories in mature science are true or at least 
approximately true, and that the same term refers to the same thing even if it occurs 
in different theories. It is the referential nature of scientific theories that explains the 
success of science.  
This realist’s argument clashes nonetheless with a compelling antirealist’s 
argument whose aim is precisely to break the link between reference and success: 
reference does not imply success, nor does success warrant a presumption of 
reference. History of science provides us with plenty of examples of theories that 
were genuinely referential and yet were neither strictly true nor necessarily 
successful (e.g. from Bohr’s atomic theory to Mendel’s genetic theory, Prout’s 
chemical theory). On the other hand, success cannot be taken as the gold standard of 
reference either: from caloric to phlogiston, from the epicycles to the ether, history 
of science provides us with an embarrassment of riches when it comes to theories 
that enjoyed a relative empirical success and that nevertheless turned out to be non-
referential. Hence the ‘pessimistic meta-induction’: as entities postulated by past 
successful theories turned out to be not existent, what can guarantee us that the 
entities currently postulated by our most successful scientific theories will not 
similarly turn out to be not existent in the future? Success cannot be taken as 
warranting a presumption of reference, pace the no miracle argument.  
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Moreover, pessimistic meta-induction has negative consequences also for 
another crucial realist’s claim: the claim that there exist inter-theoretic links among 
subsequent theories, and that theories in mature science embed earlier theories as 
limiting cases, and are able to explain why their predecessors were successful 
(insofar as they were) by preserving the references of their central terms. But if the 
central terms of the earlier theories were not referential (as in the case of ether, 
phlogiston, among others), how is it possible to retain inter-theoretic links? 
Warranting reference continuity across theory-change is all the more relevant to a 
defence of scientific realism, and this is precisely what pessimistic meta-induction 
challenges. 
Structural realism is meant to provide a solution to this problem: what 
warrants continuity across theory-change are not the entities theoretical terms refer 
(or may refer) to. In other words, it is not the ontology of a scientific theory, but 
rather the mathematical structure of the theory that warrants continuity across 
theory-change. In recent years, John Worrall has drawn attention to this 
epistemological version of structural realism, which he traces back to Henry 
Poincaré, although much of the following discussion has actually been influenced 
by Bertrand Russell more than Poincare.1  Focussing on the historical case study of 
Fresnel’s ether theory and Maxwell’s electromagnetic theory, Worrall has famously 
argued that structural realism licenses an optimistic induction about theory-change, 
concerning not scientific entities themselves but mathematical structures. Although 
there is no continuity between the ether and the electromagnetic field, continuity can 
however be found between the mathematical structures of the two theories. Fresnel 
misidentified the nature of light; nonetheless his theory described the structural 
properties of light accurately and using mathematical equations that were in fact 
formally similar to those later employed by Maxwell to describe the properties of 
the electromagnetic field. Thus, what is carried over in the passage from Fresnel’s to 
Maxwell’s theory is not ontology but mathematical structure.  
Structural realism claims then to do justice to the realist’s ‘no miracle 
argument’ by identifying in the mathematical structure the element that warrants 
continuity across theory-change and hence safeguards inter-theoretic links. Once 
again, reference explains success and success warrants a presumption of reference, 
                                                 
1 Worrall (1994). 
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where however reference is no longer identified with the ontology, i.e. with the 
unobservable entities that may (or may not) be the referents of theoretical terms, but 
with the mathematical structure of the theory. Worrall’s structuralism is mainly an 
epistemological thesis about what we can know and be realist about. In so doing, 
epistemological structural realism vindicates, rather than revises the ontological 
commitments of scientific realism. On this view, the objective world is composed of 
unobservable and unperceivable objects between which certain properties and 
relations obtain; but we can only know the properties and relations of these 
properties and relations, that is the structure of the objective world.2 However, 
precisely because of this vindication of traditional ontology, structural realism 
stands condemned together with scientific realism of leaving unsolved the problem 
of ontological discontinuity across theory-change.  
With an eye towards amending this problem, French and Ladyman have urged 
a metaphysical or ontic structural realism, which offers a ‘reconceptualisation of 
ontology, at the most basic metaphysical level, which effects a shift from objects to 
structures’.3 Modern physics itself seems to prompt this reconceptualisation, the 
necessity of rethinking from scratch our ontology in terms of ‘structures’, rather 
than in terms of ‘objects’. French and Ladyman latch their metaphysical structural 
realism onto Ernst Cassirer’s structuralism. But while Cassirer’s structuralism was 
inherently related to neo-Kantian epistemology, French and Ladyman want to 
maintain the distance from neo-Kantianism and detach metaphysical structural 
realism from neo-Kantian epistemology so as to do justice to the realist’s demand 
for mind-independence. This manoeuvre rises however some difficulties that have 
been at the centre of a recent ongoing debate: can we really ‘dissolve’ entities into 
mathematical structures? How can we even conceive of structural relations without 
relata?4 
In this paper, it is not my intention to go all over again this well-known debate 
on structural realism, but rather to ask where it leaves us and attempt a philosophical 
diagnosis. In the following section I shall try to offer a diagnosis of the current 
stand-off within structural realism between the epistemological and the 
metaphysical variant, by drawing attention to some important assumptions 
                                                 
2 Ladyman (1998), p. 412. 
3 French and Ladyman (2003a), p. 37. 
4 See Cao (2003a), (2003b). For a response see French and Ladyman (2003b). 
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underlying the structural realist programme, and to their philosophical sources. It is 
the heterogeneity of these sources—I suggest—that is mainly responsible for the 
current stand-off within structural realism. 
 
 
2. Structural realism: an overview of the philosophical sources 
 
The variety of alleged forefathers of structural realism is symptomatic of the 
mixture of philosophical sources and traditions underlying the structural realist 
programme. Worrall traces it back to Poincaré; Grover Maxwell built it up on 
Russell, and tied it to the Ramsification of scientific theories. French and Ladyman 
appeal to Cassirer. It is beyond the purpose of this paper to give a historical 
reconstruction of the philosophical origins of structural realism. But I do want to 
point out the difficulty of reconciling Poincaré’s and Cassirer’s structuralist views 
on the one side, with Russell’s structuralism on the other side. The following brief 
historical overview helps us unveil some of the hidden assumptions of structural 
realism, which I think are responsible for the tension and divergence of views that 
characterise the current debate. 
 
2.1 Poincaré’s structural realism and the physics of the principles 
 
Henri Poincaré’s structural realism is strictly connected with the so-called physics 
of the principles.5 According to Poincaré, the structural continuity between 
Fresnel’s ether theory—no matter how ontologically false the hypothesis of ether 
was—and Maxwell’s electromagnetic theory was warranted by some fundamental 
scientific principles such as the principles of conservation of energy and the 
principle of least action.6 This much celebrated historical episode notoriously 
prompted Worrall’s epistemological structural realism and the discussion that 
                                                 
5 See “The Physics of the Principles” in Poincaré (1905), Engl. transl. (1982), pp. 299-301. 
6 The principle of least action, in Maupertuis’s original formulation, says that “in Nature, the action 
necessary for change is the smallest possible” where action was defined as the product of the mass of 
the body times its velocity times the distance it moves. If we consider particles as light rays, the 
principle of least action says that the integral of the velocity of light over distance is an extremum for 
the path traversed. This principle is the converse of Fermat’s principle of least time, which says that 
the trajectories of light rays traversing different media follow the path the minimizes time (i.e., the 
integral of the inverse of velocity over distance is an extremum). 
 5 
followed Worrall’s fortunate article. This discussion had however the effect of 
shifting the focus from Poincaré’s original motivations to the realist’s demand for 
referential continuity across theory-change. As a result, the relations encoded by 
Fresnel’s equations came to be regarded as possible candidates for bearing the 
referential burden that –—for obvious reasons –—could not be borne by the ether. 
Metaphysical structural realists have subsequently latched onto this reading of the 
Fresnel–Maxwell story by stressing that these relations are all what there is from an 
ontological point of view, and not just from an epistemological one. As anticipated 
in the introduction, what is common to both these approaches is the idea that 
structural relations expressed by mathematical equations bear the referential burden 
required by the realist’s no miracle argument. They must warrant referential 
continuity, regardless of whether we believe that these relations apply to objects 
which qua referents we are in no position of ever knowing, or we believe instead 
that these relations are themselves the referents and there is no other referent to look 
for. But if we take a closer look at Poincaré, we can see that the very same idea of 
structural relations bearing a referential burden is alien to his view. In Poincaré’s 
words,  
 
the aim of Fresnel was not to find out whether there is really an ether, whether it is or is not 
formed of atoms, whether the atoms really move in this or that sense; his object was to 
foresee optical phenomena. Now, Fresnel’s theory always permits of this, today as well as 
before Maxwell. The differential equations are always true; they can always be integrated 
by the same procedures and the results of this integration always retain their value. (…) 
That some periodic phenomena (an electric oscillation, for instance) is really due to the 
vibration of some atom which, acting like a pendulum, really moves in this or that sense is 
neither certain nor interesting. But that between electric oscillation, the motion of pendulum 
and all periodic phenomena there exists a close relationship which corresponds to a 
profound reality; (…) that this is a consequence of more general principles, that of energy 
and that of least action; this is what we can affirm; this is the truth which will always 
remain the same under all the costumes in which we may deem it useful to deck it out.7   
 
According to Poincaré, both Fresnel’s and Maxwell’s theories “express true 
relations and the contradiction is only in the images wherewith we have clothed the 
                                                 
7 Poincaré (1902), Engl. transl. (1982), pp. 140-1. Emphasis added. 
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reality”.8 The contradiction between Fresnel and Maxwell is solved by giving a 
conventionalist twist to scientific theories: two theories may well both be ‘true’ if 
we give up a realist reading of their languages and regard them as different ways of 
describing the same “true relations” encoded by scientific principles. The structural 
continuity that Poincaré envisaged is grounded then on the fact that Fresnel’s wave 
optics was founded on the very same basic principles (the principle of least action 
and conservation of energy), on which Maxwell’s theory too was founded.9 And 
Poincaré deemed these scientific principles certain and almost permanent across 
scientific developments, because they are useful conventions that cannot be 
confirmed or refuted by experiments.  
Thus, in the end, the continuity between Fresnel and Maxwell is not grounded 
on any alleged referential role played by structural relations, but rather on the 
conventional nature of the scientific principles that encode these structural relations. 
It is the conventional nature of scientific principles that warrants their certainty and 
(almost) permanence across scientific theories, and hence (indirectly) warrants also 
continuity across theory-change. On the other hand, precisely because they are 
conventional, scientific principles give us enough leeway to speculate about the 
physical nature of things: they do not single out a unique description as the ‘true’ 
one (i.e., the one that corresponds to the way things are), but are instead compatible 
with alternative and apparently contradictory images.10 
Without entering into a discussion of conventionalism, it suffices here to say 
that the answer that Poincaré gave to what we now call pessimistic meta-induction 
and the problem of referential discontinuity across theory-change consisted in 
playing down semantic realism as the view that we must construe the language of 
our scientific theories literally, i.e. that we must understand theoretical terms such as 
“ether”, “electromagnetic field”, “electron”, and so forth, as referring to objects in 
the external world, and that we must understand fundamental laws of nature as 
singling out the ‘real’ (and unique) order of things in nature. Poincaré defended 
                                                 
8 Poincaré (1902), Engl. transl. (1982), p. 142. 
9 For a detailed discussion of this point see Ch. XII in Poincaré (1902), Engl. transl. (1982), pp.174-
83. 
10 For instance, both Fresnel’s wave theory of light and Laplace’s corpuscular theory of light were 
founded on the very same principle of least action. Because of the aforementioned (see footnote 6) 
interconvertibility of the principle of least action with the principle of least time (when we replace 
velocity of light with its inverse), this very same basic principle grounded both Laplacian corpuscular 
optics (least action) and Huygens/Fresnel wave optics (least time).  
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instead a conventional construal of the language of science: his structural realism 
undercut pessimistic meta-induction by playing down the very same concept of 
reference (and the related notion of truth as correspondence) on which the problem 
hinges. 
 
 
2.2 Cassirer’s structural realism and the architectonic of scientific knowledge 
 
The aim of Ernst Cassirer’s neo-Kantian position, programmatically expressed 
in Substance and Function,11 was to replace the deeply instilled ‘substantialistic’ 
conception of science with a ‘functional’ conception. According to the 
‘substantialistic conception’, the world is a world of substances, of physical entities 
bearing certain properties and entering into definite relations with other entities. 
Laws of nature are read off the entities, their properties and relations. From 
Cassirer’s ‘functional’ viewpoint, on the other hand, entities constitute no longer the 
self-evident starting point, but the final point of scientific inquiry. The starting point 
is instead the concept of ‘function’ as it emerges in mathematical physics. The 
world is a world of functional relations encoded by laws of nature, through which 
only we have epistemic access to scientific entities. In his later book Determinism 
and Indeterminism in Modern Physics12 Cassirer portrayed scientific knowledge as 
a three-layer architectonic consisting of (1) results of measurements, (2) laws, and 
(3) principles. Cassirer made it clear that this distinction should not be read 
hierarchically, or as implying some sort of reductionism. It is rather a purely 
‘architectonic’ distinction, so to speak.13 Results of measurement and scientific 
principles occupy the two complementary poles of this architectonic. The former 
provide the empirical basis. The latter fulfil the regulative task of systematizing and 
conferring an order on this empirical basis, as an integral and indispensable part of 
empirical knowledge. As a result of this systematisation, lower-level 
phenomenological laws could be derived. Cassirer clearly distinguished between 
laws and principles: scientific principles are “the birthplace of natural laws, a matrix 
                                                 
11 Cassirer (1910), Eng. trans. (1953). 
12 For a more comprehensive analysis of Cassirer’s neo-Kantian view, see Massimi (2005), Section 
1.4.2, on which I draw here. 
13 Cassirer (1936), Engl. trans. (1956), p. 36. 
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as it were, out of which new natural laws may be born again and again”.14 This 
architectonic of scientific knowledge in turn fixes and delimits the boundaries of 
‘objective reality’. According to Cassirer, ‘objective reality is attained only because 
and insofar as there is conformity to law, not vice versa’. Beyond those boundaries, 
there is no other reality for us to investigate or seek after: the boundaries of what we 
can know are the very same boundaries of reality, or at least of the reality that is 
meaningful for us, i.e. the reality we can have scientific knowledge of. By building 
up on Kant’s epistemological lesson, rather than on conventionalism, Cassirer’s 
structuralism too played down the notion of reference. Or more precisely, he 
redefined such a notion from a neo-Kantian internalist perspective, according to 
which what objects the world consists of is a question that makes sense only within 
a scientific description of reality and that we can answer only in the light of some 
fundamental mathematical functions encoded by laws and principles.  
Despite the differences, conventionalism and neo-Kantianism agree about 
giving less of a role to the notion of reference. Yet there is a third important 
philosophical source for structural realism, which does not square well with 
Poincaré’s and Cassirer’s structural realism and which nevertheless has represented 
perhaps the most influential expression of this movement: Bertrand Russell’s 
structuralism. 
 
2.3 Russell’s structural realism and the legacy of reference 
  
Among the philosophical sources of structural realism, Bertrand Russell 
occupies a special position. No-one else has exerted a greater influence on this 
movement than him. In The Analysis of Matter Russell15 anticipated most of the 
theses of epistemological structural realism. He argued that we can and do have 
knowledge of the external world, i.e. of unperceived events, but this knowledge is 
purely structural. Whereas of percepts we can know both their qualities (i.e. 
properties and relations) and the properties of their qualities (i.e. structure), of 
unperceived events we can know only the properties of their properties and 
relations: we know only the structure of the external world, not its intrinsic (first 
order) properties and relations. Despite the Kantian flavour of some sentences about 
                                                 
14 Ibid., p. 52. 
15 Russell (1927). 
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the things in themselves of the external world being unknowable noumena, the 
Kantian echoes are here filtered through Russell’s theory of reference and truth.16  
As is well known, Russell’s distinction between knowledge by acquaintance 
and knowledge by description run parallel to a distinction between terms that refer 
to things we know by acquaintance (i.e. names of sense data), and terms that refer to 
things we can only know by a description of the type ‘The one and only entity 
which…’. In this respect, Russell’s theory of descriptions anticipated the 
Ramsification of scientific theories that Grover Maxwell17 has advocated as a 
method allowing indirect reference to unperceivable entities by replacing theoretical 
terms such as ‘ether’, ‘electron’, and so forth, with Ramsey sentences of the form 
∃t1…∃tm(O1…On; t1 …tm) correlating observational data O about the putative entity 
with theoretical content t1…tm. Having so defined the reference of terms, an assertion 
can be held true—according to Russell—if the corresponding state of affairs 
obtains, false otherwise.   
Russell’s structural realism hinges on scientific realist’s intuitions about 
reference and truth. This scientific realist’s intuitions have proved persistent and  
dominant in the following philosophical literature. Structural realism was born 
precisely from an inner conflict between the scientific realist’s demand for reference 
and truth (expressed in the ‘no miracle’ argument) and the awareness that this 
demand cannot be satisfied (given pessimistic meta-induction). 
 
3. The Newman problem as a problem about reference 
 
Russell’s structural realism faces a major problem that Newman originally 
spotted.18 Saying that we know only the structure of the external world is to say 
nothing at all, because it follows from set theory or second order logic that given a 
collection of objects, there will always be a relation R holding among them and 
obeying a certain structure W, as long as W is compatible with the number of 
objects. To put the problem in a more pointed way, once the domain is fixed, there 
is no way of distinguishing a relation R from another relation S on the same domain 
                                                 
16 Russell (1912), (1914). 
17 G. Maxwell (1970a), (1970b). 
18 Newman (1928). 
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having both structure W, i.e. there is no way of distinguishing between important 
and unimportant relations.  
Newman’s problem is a problem about reference. Russell’s structural realism 
is in the end a theory about how we can fix the reference of theoretical terms and be 
sure that they are genuinely referential, even if the objects at issue are unperceived 
and unperceivable. But, as Newman pointed out, Russell’s structuralist solution was 
actually unable to single out reference, and hence unable to deliver on the original 
promise. 
Apropos of this, Demopoulos and Friedman have rightly noticed an analogy 
between the Newman problem and Hilary Putnam’s problem about reference.19 The 
problem, famously analysed in chapter 2 of Putnam’s Reason, Truth, and History, 
amounts to the following: given a language L and given an admissible interpretation 
of L, i.e. given a set of operational and theoretical constraints like those that rational 
inquirers would accept and that determine which sentences in the language are true, 
there is no way of determining what our terms refer to. Putnam shows in particular 
how a given sentence such as ‘A cat is on a mat’, where on the standard 
interpretation ‘cat’ refers to cats and ‘mat’ refers to mats, can be reinterpreted so 
that in the actual world ‘cat’ refers to cherries and ‘mat’ refers to trees without 
affecting the truth-value of the sentence in any possible world. Putnam’s argument 
is meant to be a criticism of standard scientific realism, and to prompt an alternative 
realist view, an internalist one, according to which ‘what objects does the world 
consists of? is a question that it only makes sense to ask within a theory or 
description.’20 Putnam identifies in Kant the forefather of internal realism, as a view 
opposed to what he calls the externalist perspective (the God’s eye point of view) 
typical of scientific realism, or metaphysical realism as Putnam calls it. 
The problem about reference that Newman raised against Russell’s 
structuralism is somehow complementary to the problem about reference that 
Putnam raises against metaphysical realism. Indeed they are just two sides of one 
and the same problem about reference: (i) either the reference of theoretical terms is 
fixed by objects in the external world, or (ii) the reference of terms is fixed by the 
description of the relevant structural properties of these objects. The problem with 
(i), as Putnam pointed out, is that it is not clear how reference can be singled out 
                                                 
19 Demopoulos and Friedman (1985), p. 633. 
20 Putnam (1981),  p. 49. Emphasis in the original. 
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uniquely and unequivocally on any given admissible interpretation of a language. 
Nor does (ii) fare any better on this score: as Newman showed, we cannot 
unequivocally single out reference given the description of structural properties 
either. 
 I think that the main lesson we should draw from the Newman problem 
concerns the persistence of some deeply instilled metaphysical realist assumptions 
in the current debate on structural realism, and the problems that they inevitably 
bring along with them. Russell’s structuralism crucially retained an externalist 
perspective about reference. This externalist perspective persists in the current 
debate on structural realism, and constitutes the common denominator of all the 
different variants. In the end, epistemological structural realists and metaphysical 
structural realists agree on one point: namely, that the primary aim of structural 
realism is to do justice to the (metaphysical realist) view about reference as 
expressed by the ‘no miracle’ argument. This externalist perspective about 
reference, which is the residue of Russell’s highly-influential philosophical agenda, 
faces nonetheless some inescapable problems. By contrast, there are other 
philosophical traditions, to which current debates seem to have paid only lip-
service, and that may be worth exploring since they avoid the problems affecting 
Russell’s structuralism. Poincaré’s structuralism and Cassirer’s structuralism are 
possible candidates. In what follows I advocate a neo-Kantian twist on structural 
realism along the lines of Cassirer. It is far from the scope and purpose of this paper 
to offer a full-blown neo-Kantian view on structural realism. The best I can do is to 
raise some questions and foreshadow possible answers. Much work needs to be 
done to spell out the implications of a neo-Kantian perspective. What follows must 
then be read with an eye towards improving on a still largely unexplored area. 
 
  4. A neo-Kantian perspective  
  
In the light of the Newman problem discussed above, I want to suggest that 
structural realism should not be understood as a form of semantic realism, as a way 
of retaining a literal construal of the language of science in the face of the challenge 
posed by referential discontinuity across theory-change. This way of understanding 
the aim and programmatic intent of structural realism is only the residue of 
Russell’s influential agenda, and most of the recent discussions seem to have been 
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going along Russell’s conceptual path. Epistemological structural realism follows 
Russell in identifying structure with what remains fairly stable across theory-change 
and hence as a candidate to bear the referential burden required by the no miracle 
argument. Nor does metaphysical structural realism represent a real change with 
respect to this philosophical agenda: in the end, also in this case the aim is to give 
an ontological gloss on structure so that it can better bear the referential burden by 
itself, i.e. without the need of assuming an ontology of objects as the relata of 
structural relations.  
Structural realism should instead be understood as a form of epistemic 
realism: it helps us to cash out truth, not reference. Namely, it helps us to make 
sense of what it means for an assertion like ‘the electron has momentum ’ to be 
true, where ‘to be true’ must here be understood as ‘to be justified’. Of course, the 
identification of truth with justification has a distinguished philosophical pedigree in 
the Kantian tradition, to which in recent times Hilary Putnam has drawn new 
attention.21 As is well-known, after his Kantian turn, Putnam identified truth with 
idealised rational acceptability:22 a sentence is true if we are justified to assert it 
under sufficiently good epistemic conditions, such as the ones that rational beings 
with our nature can have.23 But what are the sufficiently good epistemic conditions 
that rational beings with our nature can have? Putnam answered this question with 
rather mundane examples of macroscopic observable objects such as a chair being 
in my study and me being able to see it without anything wrong in my eyesight, etc. 
But, surely, these examples cannot address or shed light on the question that really 
matters here, namely what the sufficiently good epistemic conditions are for us to be 
                                                 
21 For the relationship between Putnam’s view and Michael Dummett’s similar view about truth as 
justification, see Putnam (1983), xvi–xviii. 
22 ‘What then is a true judgement? Kant does believe that we have objective knowledge: we know 
laws of mathematics, laws of geometry, laws of physics (…). The use of the term “knowledge” and 
the use of the term “objective” amount to the assertion that there is still a notion of truth. But what is 
truth if it is not correspondence to the way things are in themselves? (…) The only answer one can 
extract from Kant’s writing is this: a piece of knowledge (i.e. a “true statement”) is a statement that a 
rational being would accept on sufficient experience of the kind that it is actually possible for beings 
with our nature to have.’ Putnam (1981), p. 64. 
 
23 As Putnam later clarified ‘ideal’ epistemic conditions should not be confused with Peirce’s view of 
truth as intersubjective agreement of a community at the ideal limit of inquiry: ‘I do not by any 
means ever mean to use the notion of an ‘ideal epistemic situation’ in this fantastic (or utopian) 
Peircean sense. By an ideal epistemic situation I mean something like this: If I say ‘There is a chair 
in my study’, an ideal epistemic situation would be to be in my study with the lights on or with 
daylight streaming through the window, with nothing wrong with my eyesight, with an unconfused 
mind, (…). Or, to drop the notion of ‘ideal’ altogether, since that is only a metaphor, I think there are 
better and worse epistemic situations with respect to particular statements’ Putnam (1990), viii. 
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justified in asserting things about microscopic and / or unobservable objects 
(electrons, quarks, ether, phlogiston, etc.), i.e. the vast majority of objects postulated 
by our scientific theories and primarily responsible for the referential discontinuity 
across theory-change. If truth as justification is to do any job at all, we’d better fill 
the lacuna about what the sufficiently good epistemic conditions are under which 
we can make assertions about unobservable objects in a reasonable and justifiable 
(albeit fallible) way. Putnam explicitly denied the possibility of even sketching ‘a 
theory of actual warrant (a theory of the “nature” of warrant), let alone a theory of 
idealised warrant’24 and simply offered what he called a ‘picture’. It is not my 
intention or aim to provide a theory of actual warrant; needless to say, a theory of 
idealised warrant. Nevertheless I do want to sketch some possible guidelines for a 
future would-be theory of the ‘nature’ of warrant. I think that structural realism can 
help us sketch such a theory; namely, it can help us cash out what the good 
epistemic conditions are under which we may be justified in making assertions 
about unobservable objects.  In other words, I want to suggest that mathematical 
structures should not regarded as bearing the referential burden, but rather as fixing 
the epistemic conditions under which we can reasonably and justifiably (albeit 
fallibly) make assertions about physical entities. If structuralism has to play a role in 
physics at all, it should play it with respect to the epistemic conditions of justified 
assertibility rather than with respect to reference. This move of course implies a 
radical re-thinking of the aim and purpose of structural realism as it has been 
advocated and championed so far in the literature. Paraphrasing the title of a famous 
article of Worrall, if we can remain reasonably optimistic despite pessimistic meta-
induction, it is not because mathematical structures can warrant the referential 
nature of scientific theories that we feared was lost. Rather, we can remain 
reasonably optimistic because–—problem of reference notwithstanding—
mathematical structures fix the good epistemic conditions under which we are 
warranted in making assertions about certain physical entities but not about certain 
others (within the fallible and empirically revisable limits of human knowledge, of 
course). It is in this specific respect that structural realism should be regarded more 
as a form of epistemic realism than as a form of semantic realism: it cashes out 
truth, not reference. Let me try to flesh out the slogan. 
                                                 
24 Putnam (1990), p. 42. 
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From a neo-Kantian perspective as the one I want to advocate here, the good 
epistemic conditions, under which we are warranted to assert some sentences about 
unobservable physical entities, are given by a particular combination of 
experimental evidence and mathematical structures. More precisely, they are given 
by the particular way in which available experimental evidence gets built into a 
theoretico-mathematical structure. Along the lines of Cassirer’s architectonic of 
scientific knowledge, I am suggesting that the good epistemic conditions that justify 
us to assert some sentences about unobservable entities such as electrons, positrons, 
quarks, and so forth, are those conditions in which the experimental data (Cassirer’s 
‘results of measurement’) are built into first order relations among measured 
physical quantities as displayed by laws of nature, and then into second order 
structural relations (relations of relations) as displayed by scientific principles (the 
higher layers of Cassirer’s architectonic). Let me give a couple of examples to 
illustrate this point.  
 
4.1 Pauli’s exclusion principle between fermions and parafermions 
 
In my book,25 I have analysed how spectroscopic evidence accumulated in the 
old quantum theory led Wolfgang Pauli to introduce in 1925 the exclusion principle 
as a simple phenomenological rule for the closure of electronic groups. Only in 
1926, with the independent contribution of Dirac and Fermi, did it become clear that 
Pauli’s veto could be re-expressed as veto on the class of mathematical states 
allowed for electrons: it excluded all states different from the antisymmetric ones, 
where antisymmetric states are those states that change sign under permutation of 
the space and spin coordinates of two electrons. Electrons turned out to obey the 
Fermi–Dirac statistics: they were fermions. In 1940, with the proof of the spin-
statistics theorem, Pauli’s veto was extended to any half-integral spin particle. When 
in the 1960s the quark model for hadrons was introduced, quarks as half-integral 
spin particles were assumed to obey Pauli’s principle. But some negative evidence 
was found: the baryons’ spectra revealed that quark space and spin wave function 
was actually symmetric, rather than antisymmetric as required by Pauli’s principle.  
                                                 
25 Massimi (2005). 
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A possible way of reconciling this negative evidence with the quark theory 
consisted in postulating that quarks did not follow strictly the Pauli principle, and 
they obeyed instead a quantum statistics intermediate between Fermi–Dirac and 
Bose–Einstein (so-called ‘parastatistics)’: quarks may be ‘parafermions’. The 
possibility of parafermions, and more generally of paraparticles, followed from 
permutation invariance: as Greenberg and Messiah proved in 1964, in quantum 
mechanics given  the vector representing the state ψ of a composite system of n 
indistinguishable particles, it is not possible by measuring the expectation value of 
any observable B to distinguish  from any permutation P . This permutation 
invariance is satisfied not only in the case in which  is either symmetric or 
antisymmetric, but also in the case of some subspaces of the Hilbert space of 
dimension greater than 1, called generalised rays, which are invariant under all 
permutations. Thus, permutation invariance allows for symmetric, antisymmetric, 
and higher symmetry states too. Pauli’s veto turned out to be only one among other 
possible symmetry types. However, the experimental search for paraparticles did 
not give the expected results (although it is still ongoing). In the 1990s important 
experiments were run to test eventual Pauli-violating (parafermion) copper and 
helium atoms: they gave negative results, and in so doing reduced the limit on 
possible violations of the exclusion principle. In the meantime another research 
programme had been developed in the 1960s that reconciled the negative evidence 
about Pauli’s principle with the quark theory by introducing a new degree of 
freedom for quarks, the ‘colour’. Hence, the development of quantum 
chromodynamics and the experimental search for coloured quarks that has led to 
amazingly fruitful results in the past forty years (from the discovery of scaling 
violations and charmonia, to the renormalization of the electroweak theory).  
I have reconstructed all this historical evolution of the Pauli principle in detail 
in my book, where I defend a Kantian view about the origin and role of the 
exclusion principle. Here I want to draw attention instead to the role that the 
structural relations expressed by Pauli’s principle play for the above discussion 
about structural realism as a form of epistemic realism. We can distinguish three 
stages in the history of the exclusion principle: 
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(i) Pauli’s original ‘exclusion rule’ was, as I mentioned, a simple 
phenomenological rule saying that there cannot be in an atom two 
electrons in the same dynamic state (where the dynamic state was 
expressed by a set of four quantum numbers). If there is already an 
electron in that state, the state should be considered as occupied. 
This phenomenological rule expresses a simple first order relation 
about an electron, say, electron 1 being in the state say nkm, and 
another electron, say electron 2 not being in that same nkm state. 
 
(ii) Reformulated as an antisymmetrization prescription with the Fermi–
Dirac statistics, Pauli’s principle comes to express a second order or 
structural relation (a relation of relation) concerning no longer the 
dynamic state in which two electrons can be, but rather the classes 
of mathematically allowed states for an assembly of 
indistinguishable half-integral spin particles (electrons, but also 
protons, neutrons, muons, quarks, etc.). Given say an assembly of 
only two electrons, and given the two mathematically possible states 
(symmetric S and antisymmetric A) resulting from the permutation 
of the space and spin coordinates of the two electrons (i.e. given the 
two possible first order relations and ), the principle 
excludes the class of symmetric states and selects the class of 
antisymmetric states as the only mathematically allowed one. Hence 
it expresses a second order structural relation between an assembly 
of indistinguishable half-integral spin particles and the class of 
mathematical states (antisymmetric) that applies to it among all the 
mathematically possible ones. Or, to put it in a slightly different 
way, it expresses the structural relation between the kind of spin 
(half-integral) an assembly of indistinguishable particles has and the 
kind of quantum statistics (Fermi–Dirac) the particles follow. 
 
(iii) Finally, permutation invariance allows not only for symmetric or 
antisymmetric states but also for higher symmetry types. 
Accordingly, in the 1960s physicists tried to relax the ban imposed 
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by Pauli’s principle on fermions, and allowed half-integral spin 
particles (e.g. quarks) to obey para-Fermi statistics. In other words, 
it follows from invariance under the permutation group that we can 
embed the structural relation expressed by Pauli’s principle into 
some sort of disjunctive structural relation that says: given an 
assembly of indistinguishable half-integral spin particles, they can 
be with a certain probability either in the usual antisymmetric state, 
or with another probability in an anomalous (Pauli-violating) state. 
This is what the parastatistics programme claimed and tried to 
prove. 
 
Going then back to my aforementioned suggestion about structural realism as 
a form of epistemic realism, we can regard experimental evidence plus the structural 
relation encoded by Pauli’s principle as displaying some of the good epistemic 
conditions under which we are justified to make assertions about electrons, and 
more generally about fermions (protons, positrons, neutrons, quarks,…). On this 
view, we are (or are not) justified in asserting a sentence like “The omega minus 
particle consists of three equivalent s quarks” or “Copper atoms emit anomalous 
(Pauli-violating) K-shell X-rays” in the light of the particular way in which the 
available experimental evidence fits (or does not fit, respectively) into a system of 
first order, and second order structural relations expressed by phenomenological 
laws and scientific principles, respectively. Depending on this fit, we are (or are not) 
justified in asserting these sentences, and hence they are true (or false). Should the 
near future give us any positive experimental result about parafermions that would 
fit the disjunctive structural relation allowed by permutation invariance; or, should 
we modify our system of knowledge by introducing new higher-level symmetry 
principles that modify the structural relations currently known, we would 
accordingly modify and revise the conditions of assertibility of sentences about 
physical entities.   
 
4.2 Bohr vs. Einstein on physical reality 
 
This internalist perspective about physical reality as not independent of the 
particular experimental and theoretical circumstances we can avail ourselves of, is 
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perhaps the most important philosophical lesson emerging from quantum 
mechanics, in particular from the orthodox Copenhagen interpretation. As Niels 
Bohr repeatedly stressed against Einstein, what kind of physical properties we can 
meaningfully ascribe to quantum objects depends ultimately on the quantum 
mechanical formalism, on the one side, and on the empirical evidence available, on 
the other side. The Bohr–Einstein debate on the completeness of quantum 
mechanics is illuminating in this respect. The real divergence between Einstein and 
Bohr and the reason why this is such an important episode in philosophy of physics 
resides precisely in the different conceptions of physical reality endorsed by 
Einstein and Bohr.  
As is well-known, in 1935 Einstein published a joint paper with Podolsky and 
Rosen where they argued that the quantum mechanical description of physical 
reality was incomplete. Einstein was presupposing—along the lines of classical 
physics—the existence of an external, mind-independent reality that was correlated 
with a physical theory so that a theory gives a complete description of reality if and 
only if every element of physical reality has a counterpart in the physical theory.26 
Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen then fixed a criterion of physical reality, which said that 
if, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with certainty (i.e. with 
probability equal to unity) the value of a physical quantity, then there exists an 
element of physical reality corresponding to this physical quantity. The criterion 
was presented as a sufficient condition for physical reality and was said to be in 
agreement with quantum-mechanical as well as with classical ideas of reality. 
Given then the completeness condition and the criterion of physical reality, 
Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen proceeded to present a thought-experiment that 
showed how the description of physical reality given by the quantum mechanical 
formalism was incomplete, i.e. it could not capture all the physical properties a 
particle has. In particular, given a composite system of two particles that have 
interacted in the past but are no longer interacting, it was possible by measuring say 
the position of the first particle to predict with certainty the position of the second 
particle, and similarly for the property momentum. So, the second particle seemed 
to have (in the light of the criterion of physical reality) both a real position and a 
real momentum, which however were not both captured by the state function of the 
                                                 
26 Einstein, Podolsky, Rosen (1935), p. 777. 
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composite system. Hence a dilemma: either the quantum mechanical description of 
physical reality is incomplete (as EPR argued for), or we can save quantum 
mechanics completeness at the cost of saying that the properties of the second 
particle are causally influenced by the measurement of properties on the first, 
separate and non-interacting particle (which implies a violation of locality and 
separability).  
As Bohr stressed in his response to EPR,27 the argument was based on an 
essential ambiguity concerning the criterion of physical reality: that criterion was 
inadequate for the physical reality we encounter in quantum theory. As Bohr 
pointed out, although a measurement on the first particle could not physically 
disturb the second particle (locality is not violated), however the experimental 
arrangement required for the measurement determines the epistemic conditions for 
meaningfully ascribing the physical property at issue both to the first and to the 
second particle. Hence Einstein was mistaken in assuming that the second particle 
must have both an exact—yet unknown— position and momentum. An object 
cannot meaningfully be said to have certain properties in the absence of the 
experimental and theoretical conditions which make such talk meaningful. 
Quantum mechanical formalism and experimental set-up jointly provide the 
conditions under which we can justifiably ascribe properties to particles. Ascribing 
properties to particles regardless of the mathematical formalism and of the 
available experimental set-up amounts to an unwarranted metaphysical claim about 
physical reality, according to Bohr. When we run an experiment to measure the 
position of the first particle, the quantum mechanical formalism allows us to predict 
the position also of the second particle. But that very same experimental set-up that 
allows us to make assertions about the positions of the two particles, does not allow 
us to make assertions about the momentum of either particle 1 or particle 2. To do 
that, we need a different experimental set-up, incompatible with the other, such that 
when we measure momentum, we cannot in turn make any assertion about the 
position of either particle.  
Bohr’s reply to EPR implied a radical revision of the classical notion of 
physical reality that Einstein was not willing to endorse. The more recent scientific 
developments after Bell’s inequalities and Aspect’s experiments seem to favour 
                                                 
27 Bohr (1935). 
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Bohr: ironically enough, the hidden variable programme, which was prompted by 
Einstein’s desire to retain a classical picture of physical reality, can retrieve the 
quantum mechanical predictions only at the cost of giving up the important locality 
condition that EPR weaved originally against Bohr to claim that the theory was 
incomplete.  
Mathematical formalism and results of measurement are all what we have: the 
former display the mathematically allowed structural relations among the physical 
quantities of unobservable entities; the latter tell us something about the values of 
these quantities. Jointly, they give us the conditions of assertibility of sentences 
about physical entities. Or better, they jointly provide us with the (reasonably) good 
epistemic conditions under which we are justified in making certain assertions 
about unobservable entities. As such, from a neo-Kantian perspective, they are the 
truth-makers of these sentences.  
A crucial question arises at this point. For the neo-Kantian perspective I have 
sketched above to be entertainable, we must show that the epistemic conditions 
displayed by mathematical structures plus results of measurement are not a too 
large meshed net to capture truth. In other words, we want to make sure that the 
very same epistemic conditions do not license falsehood as well as truth, e.g. that 
they do not equally justify us to make assertions about the ether as well as about the 
electromagnetic field, for instance. One may object to the account sketched above 
that if the mathematical structure of Fresnel’s theory does not differ much from the 
mathematical structure of Maxwell’s theory, and if this mathematical structure has 
to fix the conditions of assertibility and hence the truth-conditions of sentences—as 
I am suggesting—, we are left with the problem of explaining why under very 
similar epistemic conditions assertions about the ether come out false whereas 
assertions about the electromagnetic field come out right. Is there any way of 
distinguishing between truth and falsehood from a neo-Kantian internalist 
perspective, i.e. without falling back once again on the notion of reference and 
saying that sentences about the ether are false simply because there is no such a 
thing as ether? This is an important challenge for a neo-Kantian internalist account. 
I shall foreshadow a possible answer to it by revisiting the much celebrated 
Fresnel–Maxwell episode. 
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5. How mathematical structures cash out truth: revisiting the Fresnel–
Maxwell case 
 
As highlighted in Section 2, there are philosophical traditions within the structural 
realism programme that do not primarily aim at preserving reference or referential 
continuity. Poincaré’s conventionalism and Cassirer’s neo-Kantianism are two 
different examples of how one may play down reference, and nevertheless have an 
answer to the threat posed by pessimistic meta-induction. Poincaré’s solution—as I 
have suggested—relies on the conventional character of scientific principles, on 
their being unassailable by experiments, which warrants their certainty and (almost) 
permanence across scientific theories. Cassirer’s solution, on the other hand, hinges 
on a particular architectonic of scientific knowledge, where scientific principles 
play a crucial role as providing systematization and unification on the empirical 
basis given by results of measurement. On Poincaré’s view, Fresnel’s theory is as 
good as Maxwell’s insofar as both express the same “true relations” encoded by the 
same (conventional) principles. Either goes, once we give up any realist construal 
of their respective languages. But this is not similarly the case from a neo-Kantian 
point of view: we want to retain a notion of truth (albeit an internal one) and show 
that Fresnel was less justified in making certain assertions about the ether than 
Maxwell was in making assertions about the electromagnetic field, despite 
similarities in their mathematical equations and despite the fact that both resorted to 
ether models in some way. Can we make sense of this distinction from a neo-
Kantian internalist perspective? 
I think we can if we start looking more closely at what Fresnel could 
justifiably assert about optical phenomena. There is a kernel of truth in Fresnel’s 
theory that remains after Maxwell: Fresnel was justified in asserting certain things 
about optical phenomena, for instance about refraction and diffraction, but not 
about polarization. And he was justified in asserting them precisely because his 
equations provided the long-sought mathematics for diffraction (confirmed by the 
unexpected result of Poisson’s experiment in 1818) as well as yielding Snell’s law 
of refraction and Huygens’s law of double refraction. On the other hand, Fresnel 
was not justified in his claims about polarization because for that he did not have 
any mathematical tool (such as the differential equations of motion later introduced 
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by Cauchy) and had to rely instead on a questionable molecular hypothesis about 
the ether.  
The polarization of light (discovered by Etienne Louis Malus in 1808) implied 
asymmetric properties that could easily be accounted for in a corpuscular theory of 
light (because corpuscles do have a shape and hence a directionality), but not in 
Fresnel’s theory as in any other wave theory of light (because waves are perfectly 
symmetrical about their axes). Fresnel had realised already in 1817 that if an 
unpolarised ray consisted of two vibratory components, one along the ray 
(longitudinal) and one at right angle to it (transverse), polarization could be 
explained if the longitudinal components were destroyed; but the main stumbling-
block was to understand how this process of selective destruction could happen 
mechanically. The solution to this problem that Fresnel found in 1821 hinged on a 
particular hypothesis about the physical nature of the ether. Fresnel postulated that 
the ether consisted of molecules in the Laplacian sense between which forces acted. 
By assuming that two parallel lines of molecules can be readily separated laterally 
but strongly resist mutual approach, he could uncouple transverse and longitudinal 
vibrations, and since the former would travel much more slowly than the latter, the 
problem of selective destruction of longitudinal waves was avoided. Thus Fresnel’s 
theory had to rely on a particular hypothesis about the molecular nature of the 
luminiferous ether in order to explain polarization.28 Fresnel finally deduced the 
wave surface of a biaxial crystal from the properties of the ether, but the resultant 
ether model and ether dynamics was not easy to construct. 
It was Augustin Louis Cauchy who in 1830 built up on Fresnel’s programme 
of ether dynamics and realised that the propagation of the transverse vibrations of 
light could be obtained from the differential equations of motion of an elastic solid. 
Not only did he correct Fresnel’s erroneous deduction of the wave surface of a 
biaxial crystal, but he introduced a new mathematical tool in wave optics, namely 
differential equations. By 1835 he developed a unified theory of double refraction 
and dispersion in which both phenomena were explained by assigning specific 
values to the constant coefficients of the differential equations. 
                                                 
28 For details, see Buchwald (1981). 
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But in 1839 James MacCullagh demonstrated that optical rotation29 was 
incompatible with the molecular equations of motion. MacCullagh proposed then a 
new type of elastic solid whose potential energy depended only on the rotation of its 
elements, and in which transverse waves alone were transmitted (with a speed of 
propagation that depended on the density of the medium). These equations were 
very similar in form to those that Maxwell proposed later but they were not taken 
too seriously at the time because there was no mechanical model available for such 
an unusual medium (incompressible and resisting only rotations of its elements). On 
the other hand, Cauchy tried to accommodate the problem of optical rotation by 
introducing periodic (instead of constant) coefficients in the differential equations. 
This was a difficult task and the new mathematics required to solve it was extremely 
complicated and underdeveloped; the failure to explain optical rotation pointed at a 
deeper difficulty with ether dynamics.  
In the meantime a major breakthrough occurred in the history of electricity 
and magnetism. Following up on the previous experimental researches of Oersted, 
Faraday, and Thomson, in 1865 Maxwell wrote A dynamical theory of the 
electromagnetic field: by contrast with an action-at-a-distance theory of the electric 
action (where forces operate between electrified bodies across finite distances of 
space), he argued that forces are mediated by the contiguous elements of an 
electromagnetic field existing in the space between separated electrified bodies. The 
propagation of force between contiguous infinitesimal elements of the 
electromagnetic field was mathematically expressed by partial differential 
equations. But already in this work, Maxwell presented only the mathematical 
equations describing the electromagnetic field and did not discuss anymore vortices 
and idle wheels as in his previous model of the electromagnetic ether:30 the 
equations have proven to be correct and survived, while the mechanical models of 
the ether were all finally abandoned.  
                                                 
29 When a beam of linearly polarised light passes through a crystal of quartz in a certain direction it 
splits into two beams, one left circularly polarised, and the other right circularly polarised. A single 
resultant beam emerges, and it is again linearly polarised, but its plane of polarisation has been 
rotated. 
30 In 1861 Maxwell wrote On physical lines of force, where the magnetic field was represented as a 
fluid filled with rotating vortex tubes, whose geometrical arrangement corresponded to the lines of 
force, and the angular velocities of the vortices corresponded to the intensity of the field. The model 
was based on an analogy between a rotating vortex tube and a tube of magnetic flux. At the time it 
was common to assume the existence of an electromagnetic ether, as a medium responsible for 
electric and magnetic phenomena and distinct from the luminiferous ether allegedly responsible for 
optical phenomena. 
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In 1873 with the Treatise on electricity and magnetism Maxwell found that 
transverse elastic waves were transmitted with the same velocity as light waves: or 
better, light consists in the transverse undulations of the same medium which is the 
cause of electric and magnetic phenomena. Indeed, given Coulomb’s law for the 
electric field E produced by a static point charge q 
 
 
 
and given the Biot–Savart law for the magnetic field B produced by a wire of 
directed length l carrying a current i 
 
 
 
where the two constant and were determined independently by experiment 
from various phenomena of electrostatics and magnetostatics, the ratio 
 
turned out to be equal to the velocity of light c squared, where the value of c had 
already been measured prior to Maxwell’s work.31 Since the value of c had already 
been measured, and so was also the value of —independently measured from 
constants and —their numerical agreement was the decisive proof that light was 
an electromagnetic wave. 
This led to the serendipitous identification of electromagnetic and 
luminiferous media, and hence to the unification of optics and electromagnetism, 
subsequently confirmed by Hertz’s experiments in 1887-8. Hertz showed that 
electromagnetic radiation had all the characteristics of light: reflection, refraction, 
interference and polarization. The direct determination of the velocity of this 
radiation was however beyond the instrumentation available to Hertz: experiments 
                                                 
31 In 1862 Foucault established an estimate of the speed of light of 298.000 km/sec which was 4% 
below the value 310.000km /sec. Maxwell himself tried to improve this estimate, and in 1868 he 
found a value of 288.000 km/sec. Soon afterwards M’Kichan found a better estimate of 
293.000km/sec. 
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run after 1895 confirmed that the speed of electromagnetic waves was equal to the 
speed of light in free space. Hertz’s experiments demonstrated then conclusively the 
validity of Maxwell equations. 
Going then back to our original question, if we take mathematical structures 
and results of measurement as jointly fixing the conditions under which we are 
justified in making assertions about unobservable entities, and hence as the truth-
makers of these sentences, we can start to appreciate the difference between Fresnel 
and Maxwell. More precisely, if we take Cassirer’s architectonic of scientific 
knowledge as some sort of test concerning the conditions of justified assertibility of 
sentences, we can now see that Fresnel’s claims about the ether do not pass the test, 
whereas Maxwell’s claims about the electromagnetic field do pass the test.   
On the one side, we have the insurmountable difficulties with Fresnel’s wave 
theory and Cauchy’s later work of ether dynamics. In order to explain polarization, 
some experimentally unwarranted hypotheses were introduced about the molecular 
nature of the ether. Nor did Cauchy’s efforts to improve on Fresnel by introducing 
differential equations solve all problems: the problem of optical rotation remained 
unsolved and pointed at a deeper difficulty with ether dynamics.  
On the other side, we have streams of different research traditions in 
electrostatics and magnetostatics that from Coulomb’s law and Biot–Savart law, via 
the works of Faraday on magnetic induction (among others), arrives at Maxwell’s 
great synthesis. Interestingly enough, this synthesis is the product of the predicted 
and experimentally confirmed agreement between the ratio of two constants 
(entering in Coulomb’s and Biot-Savart’s law, respectively) and the squared value 
of the velocity of light, independently measured as early as 1862. The experimental 
values of these three quantities —independently found from a variety of 
electric, magnetic and optical phenomena—are the “results of measurement” that 
via Coulomb’s and Biot-Savart laws lead to Maxwell’s synthesis. In turn, 
Maxwell’s synthesis predicted that electromagnetic waves should have all the 
observable characteristics of light (reflection, refraction, interference and 
polarization) as was later confirmed by Hertz’s experiments. Maxwell’s equations 
provide the long-sought synopsis of a wide-ranging array of electromagnetic and 
optical phenomena. Many already known phenomenological laws (from Faraday’s 
law of induction to Ampère’s law) could be deduced from them.  
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It is this serendipitous architectonic of results of measurement, laws and 
principles that from a neo-Kantian point of view justifies Maxwell’s claims about 
the electromagnetic field. On the other hand, it is precisely the lack of a similar 
architectonic that explains why Fresnel was not similarly justified in his claims 
about the ether. Despite similarities between Fresnel’s equations and Maxwell’s, 
there is a crucial difference that justifies the latter but not the former: Maxwell’s 
claims were built into (indeed, they were one of the highest expressions of) a 
system of scientific knowledge, which has an empirical basis constituted by 
experimental results, and mathematical structures at the higher level providing the 
necessary synopsis to this empirical basis. Experimental results and mathematical 
structures are all what we have. Only within their boundaries can we try to make 
reasonable guesses about what there is or there is not.   
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Where does all this discussion leave us? We saw that the original motivation 
behind structural realism was the attempt to reconcile two conflicting arguments: the 
realist’s ‘no miracle’ argument, and the antirealist’s ‘pessimistic meta-induction’. 
Given the neo-Kantian perspective I have been urging, new light can be cast on these 
two arguments.  
As we saw, the core of the ‘no miracle’ argument consists in showing that there 
is a crucial two-way relationship between reference and success: reference explains 
success, and success in turn warrants a presumption of reference. However, the main 
problem that the received view of structural realism faces concerns precisely 
reference. The Newman problem is a problem about reference. Hence the shift I have 
urged from structural realism intended as a form of semantic realism to structural 
realism as a form of epistemic realism, where the structural relations displayed by 
our mathematical formalism should not be understood as ‘what remains fairly stable 
across theory-choice’ and hence as warranting referential continuity across scientific 
revolutions, but rather as what fixes (together with experimental evidence) the 
conditions of justified assertibility, and hence the truth-conditions of sentences about 
unobservable entities.  
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Accordingly, the ‘no miracle’ argument needs to be reconsidered. On the 
received structural realist view, the argument runs as follows: there are some 
objective (mind-independent) structural features of the external world which are 
somehow isomorphic to the mathematical structures of our scientific theories, and 
this explains the empirical success of science. However, the Newman problem stands 
against this structuralist version of the no miracle argument. Since structure does not 
pick out a unique relation on a given domain, and in fact there may well be more 
than one relation on the same domain compatible with the same structure, the 
success of our scientific theories does not warrant any presumption of reference and 
on the contrary it risks being once again a miracle or a lucky coincidence.  
I want to suggest a sort of post-Darwinian solution to the no miracle argument, 
echoing van Fraassen’s so-called ‘Darwinian’ solution to it. From a neo-Kantian 
perspective, we can do justice to the realist’s intuition behind the no miracle 
argument, albeit in quite different terms, namely without entrusting structure with 
any referential role. My ‘post-Darwinian’ account describes the survival of currently 
accepted theories in terms of a process of mutual adaptation between the 
mathematical structures of the theory on the one side, and the experimental evidence 
available on the other side. Adaptation is a two-way street: we fit our mathematical 
structures to the available experimental data, but we also modify and extend the 
experimental data to reach an increasingly better fit with the mathematical structure. 
It is the mutual fit of these two elements that provides the ‘environment’—so to 
speak—where scientific entities evolve and come to be selected, where note that 
they do not simply adapt to this (mathematical and experimental) ‘environment’ but 
they actively contribute to its modification and evolution by feeding it constantly 
with new pieces of experimental evidence.  Taking inspiration from evolutionary 
biology, we can regard the relationship between our scientific theories and 
unobservable physical entities as analogous to the relationship between niches and 
creatures.32 As creatures and niches evolve together and together come to be 
selected by developing suitable symbiotic strategies, similarly we can regard 
unobservable physical entities (e.g. protons, quarks, muons,….) as evolving together 
                                                 
32 I owe this metaphor to Thomas Kuhn (1991), who in his later years repeatedly used it to describe 
the role of a scientific lexicon to shape our scientific categories. Although I do not agree with Kuhn 
on scientific lexicons and incommensurability (see Massimi, 2005, chapter 3), I want to use this 
metaphor to describe a quite different relationship, namely that between our scientific theories and 
scientific entities.  
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and being selected together with certain specific mathematical structures plus 
experimental evidence that jointly provide the ideal ‘environment’ for the survival 
of those entities.  
Thus, my ‘post-Darwinian’ account retains unobservable entities but regards 
them in a ‘dynamic way’: unobservable scientific entities are not mind-independent 
objects, given once and for all, that our scientific theories can at most try to 
represent, as an externalist (God’s eye) viewpoint would suggest. Rather, 
unobservable scientific entities evolve with time and with the evolution of our 
scientific knowledge. In the end, what electrons, quarks, muons are, is a question 
that can only make sense given a certain mathematical formalism and some 
available experimental evidence. Scientific entities are not prior to scientific 
theories. But they arise instead out of our scientific theories, or more precisely they 
evolve symbiotically with our scientific theories.  
From this point of view the success of science is not miraculous, and it is not 
surprising either. The mathematical structures of our scientific theories allow us to 
make various types of predictions. For instance, from permutation invariance we 
can predict the existence of both Pauli-obeying quarks and of Pauli-violating 
paraparticles. It is experimental evidence, namely results of measurement that in the 
end have given the verdict to Pauli-obeying quarks rather than to Pauli-violating 
paraparticles. We now believe that there are coloured quarks, but not paraparticles, 
because we are justified in making some assertions about the former, but not about 
the latter. Mathematical structures disclose the spectrum of possible predictions we 
can make: some of them will turn out true, some others will turn out false. In the 
end, the verdict is given by the available experimental evidence: echoing Cassirer, 
results of measurement are the alpha and omega of our system of knowledge. This 
solution is not going to appeal scientific realists: from an internalist, neo-Kantian 
perspective, the no miracle argument looses some of its realist strength. But, on the 
other hand, if we cannot live up to the promise of the no miracle argument (given 
the aforementioned problem about reference), perhaps it is wise to reformulate the 
argument in a way that does not take any longer reference for granted.  
The main advantage of this strategy is that it becomes easier to reconcile the 
no miracle argument with pessimistic meta-induction. Playing down with reference 
can help us mitigate the tension between the two arguments. More precisely, 
pessimistic meta-induction need no longer be as frightening as it has traditionally 
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appeared. It may well turn out in the future that there are not really such things as 
coloured quarks, electrons, protons as there were not such things as caloric, ether, 
and phlogiston. But from an internalist perspective, this has not the devastating 
consequences that it has for an externalist perspective. From an internalist 
perspective, we may simply say that as we have discarded caloric, ether and 
phlogiston because they turned out to be obsolete and no longer functional with 
respect to the available theoretical knowledge and empirical evidence, similarly we 
may one day discard electrons, coloured quarks, and muons on similar grounds, i.e. 
because ‘unfit’ to the ‘environment’ displayed by our current mathematical 
structures and experimental evidence. And this is as it is to be expected on an 
empirical and revisable view of science, according to which our currently accepted 
scientific entities are those that have evolved together with our scientific theories, 
but nothing guarantees us that it will continue to be so.  
To conclude, a neo-Kantian perspective has the advantage of 
demystifying some both realist and antirealist assumptions behind structural 
realism. It can explain the success of science without resorting to the God’s eye 
point of view about reference. It can shed light on the reason why scientific 
entities get discarded across theory-change without dispensing with scientific 
entities altogether. It does not make the success of science a miracle, but it does 
not take it for granted either. It can do justice to scientific revolutions without 
leading us to conceptual relativism. A science within the boundaries of 
mathematical structures and empirical evidence is all what we have and can be 
realist about: there is for us no other reality to be investigated and sought after. 
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